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$4.00 for each additional title or copy in the same shipment.Is capital market integration causing East Asian countries to converge on a single 
model of corporate governance – the so-called Anglo-American model of minority 
investor protections?  What explains the variation in the rate and pattern of 
institutional convergence among countries?  Do investors and firms interacting in 
anonymous markets convergence, or do states play a role? Does convergence 
on the Anglo-American model signal the victory of markets over the   
“developmental state”? 
  
Evidence from a sample of six Asian and six European countries between 1989 
and 1999 indicates a process of shallow rather than deep convergence on the 
Anglo-American model.
1 Foreign portfolio investors assign a good governance 
premium to shares in countries that adopt minority investor protections. The 
pattern of institutional change in response to this price incentive is uneven; the 
Asian countries have a higher average level of conformance, and more variation 
in conformance levels, than the European countries in this sample.   
 
Strikingly, the state has been the prime mover behind corporate governance 
change in both the Asian and European countries in this sample, rather than 
private shareholders or employee-managers. Variation among states is explained 
by the degree to which minority investor protections offer states a solution to the 
fiscal costs imposed by poor corporate governance. In sum, shallow 
convergence has been driven by public purpose rather than private profit.  
 
The commanding role of the state in corporate governance change belies the 
conventional wisdom that profit-maximizing private shareholders and enlightened 
professional managers are the drivers of global convergence towards a single  
“best practice” of corporate governance. Close scrutiny of the behavior of private 
shareholders (“blockholders” in governance parlance) who control many of the 
firms this twelve country sample reveals that they have done little to support 
governance changes towards the Anglo-American model, and have actively 
resisted such changes in many cases.  By the same token, professional 
employee-managers in these twelve countries have systematically resisted most 
governance reforms. 
 
Instead, process tracing of regulatory changes points to the state as the prime 
mover of governance changes. The state’s motives for supporting the Anglo-
American model include income from the privatization of previously state-owned 
enterprises, moral hazard losses from poor governance (especially in the 
financial sector), and the funding of state pension plans. The state in these 
countries pushed through most of the changes in accounting, audit, disclosure, 
and oversight that resulted in shallow convergence.   
                                                            
1 This sample includes six European (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain) and six Asian countries (China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan), which 
together account for 42% of the MSCI Global Market Index weighted by GDP, 27% of the total 
MSCI market capitalization in current dollars, and over 75% of the non-U.S. and non-U.K. MSCI 
market value.    
Although these findings conclude that corporate governance convergence does 
not constitute a “triumph of private markets over the state”, they also suggest  
that something more complicated is going on, more subtle than the simple 
dichotomy of markets and states would suggest. The minority investor 
protections traced in this paper require more regulation by the state, not less 
supervision: this is not the race-to-the-bottom of competitive deregulation. But 
these governance changes are not mere re-regulation, as some have suggested, 
the old developmental state in new bottles.
2 It is regulation of a qualitatively 
different kind, based on arm’s length supervision through the neutral, quasi-
independent agencies that set accounting standards, impose disclosure 
requirements, and punish insider-trading abuses.
3   
 
What’s New Here? 
 
This paper operationalizes corporate governance as the dependent variable with 
objective criteria, providing a cross-country comparisons for a twelve country 
sample to explain what causes governance institutions to change over time. Most 
work in the economics of corporate governance measures the impact of different 
governance institutions on macro or micro outcomes, but the institutions 
themselves are usually taken as a given, and rarely examined as the dependent 
variable.  
 
Once the governance institutions had been benchmarked, changes in 
governance institutions were process-traced back to a causal actor in each 
country, based on field interviews by the author. The sample countries were 
selected to represent a large percentage of stock markets outside the U.S. and 
the U.K.  In an earlier professional incarnation, the author incorporated or 
managed a firm in 9 of the 12 countries in the sample, and had access to a 
network of managers, bankers, attorneys, accountants, and search firms with 
whom to verify institutional practices.  
  
The following section of this paper analyzes foreign portfolio equity investment 
(the independent variable) and explores the conformance of governance 
institutions in the twelve country sample (the dependent variable). The paper 
then introduces the intermediate variable of ownership type, and examines each 
of three ownership types – private blockholders, employee-managers, and the 
state – for evidence that each ownership type supported or resisted governance 
changes in these countries. A concluding section recaps the findings and briefly 
summarizes their theoretical and public policy implications. 
 
                                                            
2 Steven Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries, 
1996.  
3 For a theory explaining the trend towards arm’s length regulation by statutory agencies, see 
Giandomenico Majore, Regulating Europe, 1996 
 2. The FPI Tsunami in Asia 
 
A flood of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) has swept all the countries in the 
sample, including the six Asian states.  Foreign ownership as a percentage of 
market capitalization in the twelve countries in the sample doubled from 11.2 in 
1989 to 21.2 in 1999. Foreigners’ share of the Asian market capitalization 
trebled, from 4.2% to 13%.
4   
 
Table 1: Foreign Equity Ownership
5  
 
Country   1989  (%) 1999  (%)   Growth  (%) 
  
China    2.3   4     17 
Japan    3.9   16     41 
Korea    2.1   21.1     100 
Malaysia   10   19.6     20 
Singapore   5   10     20 
Taiwan   2   7.2     36   
Asian  Mean   4.2   13      
European  Mean  18.2   29.3      
Sample  Mean  11.2   21.2    
 
The growth and change in foreigners’ share is particularly dramatic for Japan and 
Korea, increasing by four times in Japan and ten times in Korea over this 
decade.  
 
U.S. and U.K.-based investors (hence the “Anglo-American” sobriquet) acquired 
the lion’s share of this increased foreign ownership, including the Asian markets. 
Table 2 shows that these U.S. and U.K. investors account for three-quarters of 
the financial asset pool and 87% of all equity holdings among the “Big Five” 
economies.  
 
Table 2: Institutional Investor Size, 1999 ($ billions)
6 
 
Country   Total  Assets  % in Equity  Share of Total Equity 
U.S.    $15,800  .45   .72 
U.K.    $2,200 .67   .15 
                                                            
4 FPI is the fastest-growing component of international capital flows, far outpacing bank lending 
and running a close second to foreign direct investment (FDI). IMF, International Capital Markets: 
Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, 1999, page 52.  Although the term FPI usually 
includes fixed income instruments as well, in this paper the term FPI refers only to equity assets. 
5 Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs, fibv.com; various country stock exchanges; 
author’s calculations. 
6 Carolyn Brancato, “International Patterns of Institutional Investment,” The Conference Board 
Institutional Investment Report, April 2000, page 9. For the United States alone, largely 
institutional holdings of foreign equities grew from $200 billion in 1989 to $600 billion in 1994 to 
$2 trillion in 1999. www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/invpos.htm. 
 Japan    $3,200 .19   .06 
France  $1,200 .30   .04 
Germany   $1,200 .19   .02 
 
Money-managers in New York and London became minority shareholders with, 
on average, a fifth of the control rights over all traded firms in these sample 
countries, and almost 15% of the Asian control rights, in a relatively short period 
of time.  Given the stable, concentrated holdings that characterize all of these 
markets, this 15% holding represented a majority of the traded “float” in most of 
these countries.  
 
In parallel with this influx of foreign capital, the value of stock markets in these 
countries soared during this period.  For all six Asian countries, the total value 
increased from $3.3 trillion to $5.6 trillion in current dollar equivalents.  Setting 
aside Japan, which dominates the Asian sample in size, the other five countries 
grew dramatically, from $350 billion to $1.2 trillion, a growth of 3.4 times. 
  
 
Table 3: Growth in Equity Markets
7  
 
Country   1989 ($bn)  1999 ($bn)  Growth (%)   
China    57   158   176 
Japan    2928   4455   52 
Korea    110   306   177 
Malaysia   48   139   382 
Singapore   35   198   478 
Taiwan   99   376   279 
Asian Sample  3277    5632 
 
Belgium   65   184   183 
France  311   1502   382 
Germany   355   1432   303 
Italy    148   728   389 
Netherlands   120   695   480 
Spain    111   431   287 
Total    4387   10604   298 
 
 
3.  Institutional Roots of the “Governance Premium” 
 
When Anglo-American investors participated in this international equity boom, 
drawn by potential gains from both income growth and portfolio diversification, 
they sailed into uncharted territory, into countries that traditionally paid little heed 
to the interests of minority investors – particularly in Asia. They were exposed to 
both agency costs by entrenched managers, with profits sacrificed to managerial 
                                                            
7  IMF Emerging Markets Data, various country stock exchanges, author’s calculations. 
 autonomy, full employment, or other “stakeholders,” and expropriation costs by 
majority shareholders, with profits diverted by a private blockholder or the state.    
 
These investors could protect themselves to some degree against both agency 
and expropriation costs by means of corporate governance institutions that 
protect the interests of minority investors.
8 For example, detailed financial 
disclosure using standard accounting practices and third-party audit reduces the 
monitoring risk. Independent boards of directors with a fiduciary liability to 
minority shareholders can protect the investors from entrenched managers and 
blockholders. Rules for contests of control can discipline entrenched managers 
or private blockholders and force them to share the takeover premium with 
minority shareholders. Managerial incentives such as stock options can align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders. 
 
These institutional protections are reflected in share prices. Statistical, survey, 
and anecdotal evidence suggest that foreign portfolio investors assign a 
significant price discount to shares they purchase in firms whose governance 
practices do not protect the interests of minority shareholders against agency 
and expropriation costs.
9 A McKinsey survey of two hundred investors found the 
average good governance premium for a sample of twenty-two countries to be 
21.6%, with a low of 17.9% and a high of 27.6%.
10 Mitton analyzed a sample of 
four hundred firms in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand before and 
after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 and found statistical evidence for a 
12% premium valuation on firms that had adopted superior information 
institutions; moreover, firms that followed these two information practices came 
through the perturbations of the Asian Financial Crisis trading at a 58% premium 
over those Asian firms that did not follow these practices.
11 
  
In the face of this “good governance premium”, the rate of change and pattern of 
conformance is remarkably varied. The three charts in Table 4 operationalize 
seven corporate governance institutions in terms of their conformance to the 
                                                            
8 Following the distinction drawn by North, institutions are the rules of the game, and business 
firms are the players: “Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, 
determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those 
opportunities.” Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 
page 7. 
9 Stephen Davis, “Leading Corporate Governance Indicators: An International Comparison,” 
November 1999, www.dga.com; Sang Yong Park, “Value of Governance of Korean Companies: 
International Investors Survey,” manuscript, April 1999.   
10 Robert Felton, Alec Hudnut, and Jennifer van Heeckeren, “Putting a value on Board 
Governance,” The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4 (1996); McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey, June 
2000,  www.gcgf.org. In this survey, “good governance” was defined as a majority of outside 
directors, extensive disclosure, and use of stock options for directors – a rather narrow range of 
governance institutions.   
 11Todd Mitton, “A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian 
Financial Crisis,” MIT manuscript, 3/15/2000.  In these tests of the effects of information 
institutions, Mitton controlled for firm size and financial leverage, and included both country and 
industry dummy variables, with a sample size of 384 firms based on Worldscope data.  
 Anglo-American governance model in a series of “snapshots” taken in 1989, 
1994, and 1999. Shaded boxes indicate protection for minority investors in line 
with the expectations of Anglo-American investors, and white boxes indicate little 
or no such protection.
12 Institutional detail for each country is summarized in 
Appendix 1.  
 
[Table 4. - See page 44 ] 
  
 
The Asian countries range from a low of 1 for China, to a high of 6 for both 
Malaysia and Singapore, displaying wider variation than the European countries 
in the sample. The average conformance level for the Asian countries in 1999 
(50%) is higher than the average of the European countries (45%), with higher 
scores for both oversight and control institutions, and lower scores for 
management incentives. The overall rate of change for the twelve country 
sample is dramatic, more than doubling from an average conformance ratio of 
19% in 1989 to 48% in 1999.  Most of the change for the European countries 
occurred in the five years between 1989-199, whereas most of the change for the 
Asian countries took place later, between 1994-99.  
 
Conformance for accounting and audit practices increased from 20% to 67%, in a 
similar pattern of change in both Asia and Europe. Conformance oversight grew 
more modestly, although still doubling over the period.  Although there was 
considerable change in control voting rules, there was zero change in takeover 
rules, reflecting a blanket refusal to adopt the institution of market-based contests 
for control, a.k.a. hostile takeovers, in both the Asian and European sample.  
 
Can this variation in conformance among countries and between institutions be 
explained simply in terms of firms’ response to the FPI good governance 
premium, or are there other variables at work?  
    
                                                            
12 Accounting systems are coded 1 (black box) if a majority of the listed firms use GAAP or IAS in 
their reporting, or if the deviations of the country’s domestic accounting systems from IAS are 
minor. The former datum is taken from the reports of country stock exchanges or survey 
agencies; the latter is based on the opinions of professional Big Five auditors interviewed by the 
author. Audit is coded 1 if third-party audit is a listing requirement. Oversight is assigned using 
the mean percentage of non-executive directors on the boards of listed firms; where NED’s are a 
majority, oversight is coded 1 (except for Germany and the Netherlands, which are exceptions 
discussed further below). Fiduciary duty is coded 1 if directors’ liability to minority shareholders 
has been enforced in the courts on the basis of derivative or class-action suits.  Voting rights is 
coded 1 if the principle of “one share one vote” is observed in practice, in terms of statutory rights 
and procedures. If more than 50% of the listed firms employ significant anti-takeover provisions, 
the box is coded 0.  Incentive is coded 1 if the sum of performance bonus and stock options 
exceeds 10% of total pay, based on a Towers & Perrin survey. These conformance rankings are 
consistent with those of Davis Global Advisors and similar to those performed by Déminor, with a 
few exceptions. For a discussion of the pitfalls of governance rankings, see Eric Coppieters, “The 
Governance Scorecard” and “Governance Ratings in Europe”, Corporate Governance 
International, March 2001.  
 4.  Agency Costs, Expropriation Costs and Insider Control  
 
Except for the United States and United Kingdom, insider systems are the rule, 
not the exception, around the world. Shareholdings are concentrated, not 
fragmented, in both Europe and Asia.
13 In systems of insider governance,   
expropriation costs become as important as agency costs from the standpoint of 
minority investors. 
 
Insider governance can be further subdivided into three ownership types, each 
exhibiting a different response to the governance premia offered by foreign 
portfolio investors.   
o  In the first ownership type, private blockholders control the firm, usually 
the founder or a founding family. A minority of the shares (or a minority of 
the control rights) are publicly traded, with the blockholder retaining control 
directly  via mechanisms such as two-class voting rights, “preference 
shares”, “golden shares” or indirectly through a chain of pyramids or 
intermediary holdings. The private blockholder monitors managers to keep 
agency costs under control, and compensates himself by expropriating 
minority shareholders through private benefits of control. 
o In the second ownership type the state is the blockholder. The 
government (usually the Ministry of Finance) holds a controlling share 
directly, or indirectly via so-called “golden shares”, granting the state a 
veto over control decisions. The state may or may not monitor managers 
to control agency costs, and may also expropriate minority shareholders. 
o  In the third ownership type, voting control is widely diffused among 
fragmented shareholders or concentrated in a financial institution or other 
corporation that is in turn widely held. Absent a mechanism for disciplining 
the firm via contests for control, ownership is effectively in the hands of 
employee-managers – the ultimate insiders. Employee-managers may or 
may not monitor each other, and they may be indifferent to agency costs.  
 
Table 5 provides an estimate of the percentages of the weighted value of traded 
equity held by the three ownership types for the countries in this sample, drawing 
on recent research that traces ultimate control by blockholders back through 





                                                            
13 Colin Mayer, "Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development", 307-332; 
Marco Becht and Ailsa Roell, "Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison," European 
Economic Review, Vol. 43 (1999): 1049-1056; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Andrei Shleifer, "Corporate Ownership Around the World", 1998; Stijn Claessens, Simeon 
Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, "Who Controls East Asian Corporations?" The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.   
 Table 5 Ownership Pattern (%)
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Country Private  Blockholder    State   Employee-Manager 
China    0    100   0 
Japan    8    2   90 
Korea    68    5   27 
Malaysia   60    25   15 
Singapore   60    30   10 
Taiwan   65    5   30 
 
Asian  Sample 43.5    27.8   28.6 
European  Sample  45    17   31 
Total  Sample   44    23   33 
  
The Asian sample has more variation than the European sample, as it contains 
four countries with high private blockholder ratios and two countries, China and 
Japan, on the extremes of the state and employee-manager control. Compared 
to the mean value of the sample, stock markets in Korea and Taiwan are clearly 
dominated by private blockholders. Many of the Korean corporate groups, or 
chaebol, show small nominal ownership percentages by the controlling family, as 
do many industrial groups in Taiwan, but when the veil of indirect control is 
pierced, the underlying pattern of concentrated family control is revealed – two-
thirds of the market value is in the hands of a few families.
15 Singapore and 
Malaysia also have high private blockholder concentrations, mostly in the hands 
of a small number of Overseas Chinese (hua qiao) families, coexisting with a 
larger state-controlled sector. In China the state dominates as the ownership 
type, while Japan is dominated by manager-controlled firms. In Japanese 
manager-controlled firms there is ultimately no private blockholder with a motive 
or means to maximize shareholder value.
16 
                                                            
14 European cases are based on data collected by Christoph van der Elst, “The Equity Markets, 
Ownership Structures and Control: Towards International Harmonization?” Universiteit Gent 
Working Paper 2000-04, 9/2000; European Corporate Governance Network, www.ecgn.org; 
Marco Becht and Colin Mayer, The Control of Corporate Europe, forthcoming; and Becht and 
Boehmer, op. cit. The Asian cases are based on data collected by Claessens op. cit. plus papers 
from the OECD Forum on Corporate Governance in Asia and the author’s own calculations.     
15 The chaebol founder-blockholders include Chung Ju Yung of Hyundai, Lee Byung Chul of 
Samsung, Koo In Hwoi of LG, and Kim Woo Choong of Daewoo (now a fugitive).  
16 “Cross-shareholdings have altered the concept of the stock company in Japan. They have 
freed management substantially from the influence of shareholders. Stable shareholders are 
selected by and are dependent on management, and cannot therefore play a disciplinary role on 
corporate management….This leaves the main source of disciplinary pressure coming from the 
need to satisfy employees.” Seiichi Masuyama, “The Role of Japanese Capital Markets” in N. 
Dimsdale and M. Prevezer, editors, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, page 334. See 
also Masahiko Aoki and Hugh Patrick, The Japanese Main Bank System, 1994; Paul Sheard, 
“Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance in Japan, in M. Aoki and R. Dore (eds.), 
The Japanese Firm, 1994; W. Karl Kester, “Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual 
Governance”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 9 No. 3; Jun-Koo Kang and Rene M. Stulz, 
"Is Bank-centered Corporate Governance Worth It? A Cross-sectional Analysis of the 
Performance of Japanese Firms during the Asset Price Deflation", unpublished manuscript, 1997; 
  
Each ownership type reacts differently to the governance premium offered by 
foreign portfolio investors, as each ownership type faces a different set of 
benefits and costs if the governance institutions change to protect minority 
investors from both agency and expropriation costs. The next three sections of 
this paper examine the role of the dominant ownership type in each country with 
regard to changes in minority shareholder protections.   
 
5. The Puzzle of Passive Blockholders  
 
The conventional private-actors-and-markets argument for convergence looks to 
private profit as the key to governance changes. In this story, private 
blockholders react to the prospect of changes in corporate governance 
institutions by weighing the potential gains from higher valuation of their equity 
holdings against the loss of their private benefits of control.
17 
 
If this calculus favors accepting the “good governance deal” from FPI, then       
private blockholders should first unilaterally adopt good governance practices to 
the extent they can do so informally without regulatory change, such as a third-
party auditor, extensive disclosure, independent directors, and a one-share-one-
vote capital structure. They should then press for regulatory changes in those 
areas beyond their unilateral control, such as the accounting system, directors’ 
fiduciary responsibility to minority shareholders, takeover rules protecting 
minority shareholders, and the use of stock options for managers, on a collective 
basis through their federation of industry. Finally, they should liquidate their 
concentrated blockholdings to “cash in” on the good governance premium 
extended to them by FPI. 
  
First, the temporal expectation that private blockholders will unilaterally adopt 
good governance standards for informal institutions they can control at the firm 
level and then lobby their governments for changes in formal institutions is not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ulrike Schaede, Takeo Hoshi, and John McMillan, "Japanese Deregulation: What You Should 
Know”, www.nmjc.org; Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, "Determinants of the Japan Premium: 
Actions Speak Louder than Words", NBER Working Paper No. 7251, 1999, 
www.nber.org/papers/w7251; Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, “The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly: The Costs and Benefits of the Japanese Main Bank System,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston working paper, 10/2000.  
17 The private blockholder evaluates whether the increase in value caused by the higher valuation 
of the firm on a per-share basis, multiplied by the blockholders percentage ownership, minus the 
taxes to be paid on liquidation of that ownership, is greater or less than the net present value of 
the future stream of private benefits of control (PBOC), minus the costs of extracting those private 
benefits.  More formally, is [(∆ P/E) * (ownership%) * (1-t) ] > [(NPV PBOC) * (costs of extracting 
PBOC)]? This simple equation ignores the diversification benefit whereby the blockholder can 
invest his liquidated proceeds (net of tax) in a diversified portfolio, whereas he remains over-
exposed to a single firm (or corporate group) as a blockholder.  The “costs of extracting PBOC” 
are equivalent to the “cost of theft” in the blockholder’s utility function, described in La Porta et al., 
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, NBER Working Paper 7403, October 1999, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7403.  
 borne out by the pattern of change in any of these countries individually, nor for 
the sample as a whole. This expectation is tested in Table 6, which ranks 
governance institutions by increasing formality, meaning that institutional 
changes require regulatory action by the state rather than unilateral innovation by 
firms. If blockholders did innovate informal institutions and then lobby for change 
in formal institutions, the conformance ranking and change should be highest at 
the top, i.e. for management incentives, and lowest at the bottom, i.e. for 
fiduciary responsibility, which is embedded in the court system. However, the 
conformance rankings of the Asian countries in Table 6 show no pattern of 
informal innovation followed by formal regulatory change, either by country or for 
the whole sample.   
 
Table 6:  Informal and Formal Change   
 
Institution     Conformance Change   
Management  Incentive   2    2 
Non-executive  directors   3    2 
Takeover  rules    0    0      
Audit      5    3 
Accounting  system    2       2 
Voting  rules     5    3      
Fiduciary  responsibility   5    3      
 
Secondly, there is no evidence that private blockholders lobbied for governance 
changes on a collective basis. For every country in this sample in which business 
firms engage in collective lobbying through a group such as the Federation of 
Korean Industry (FKI), these collective business entities have been passive or 
hostile with regard to corporate governance reforms, despite active lobbying 
across a wide range of other regulatory issues. Business federations have been 
most hostile to governance reforms in countries with the highest concentration of 
private blockholders, including Korea (68%) and Taiwan (65%).  
 
Thirdly, as for the expectation that private blockholders should incrementally 
liquidate their concentrated holdings to take advantage of the FPI premium for 
good governance, there is no evidence of this taking place in any country in the 
sample. In Korea, the top thirty chaebol blockholders have increased  their 
concentration within affiliated groups in recent years, in the face of pressure from 
the state and incentives from FPI to do so.
18 Anecdotal evidence from   Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore shows no signs of large private blockholders reducing 
their holdings in order to profit from higher FPI valuation; on the contrary, as in 
Korea, many owner-families have been concentrating their ownership holdings.
19    
                                                            
18 Myeong-Hyeon Cho, “Corporate Governance in Korea”, paper for UCSD Conference on 
Corporate Restructuring in Korea, 10/2000.  
19 This conclusion is based on the author’s interviews with investment bankers and fund 
managers in Europe and Asia in 1999 and 2000.  There is little public domain information on this 
question; the ownership pattern data presented in Table 5 is static - essentially a snap-shot, 
drawn for this sample from the first wave of ownership disclosure in Europe and Asia that began 
   
What explains this apparent failure of private blockholders to accept the “good 
governance deal” from FPI’s? Either blockholders were not motivated to adopt 
governance reforms because the private benefits continued to outweigh the FPI 
valuation benefits, or the blockholders were motivated to accept the “good 
governance deal” but were unable to press through governance reforms for other 
reasons. 
 
Stock market valuation can motivate blockholders with money, but it cannot 
compensate blockholders for the psychological benefits of control, in terms of 
prestige, nationalism  (as in the case of the chaebol founder-chairmen whose 
firms built the Korean “economic miracle”), or the satisfaction of placing children 
into jobs in the family firm.  
 
Nor can stock markets protect the blockholder form the tax collector. It is easier  
for private blockholders to route private benefits through offshore tax shelters and 
to skip intergenerational taxation by passing their blockholdings to children.     
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the countries with the highest private 
blockholder weights also exhibit patterns of capricious taxation by the authorities 
and widespread tax evasion by business owners, as in Korea, Malaysia, and 
Taiwan. 
 
Stock markets themselves can be capricious, and blockholders observed the 
rapid run-up and abrupt crash of emerging market valuations during the latter half 
of the 1990’s, which increased the discount rate they assigned to the “good 
governance deal”. In contrast to these market uncertainties, although the private 
blockholder is exposed to high firm risk because of his concentrated holdings, he 
also has the benefit of insider knowledge and (usually) accumulated expertise in 
his industrial sector. Moreover, since many blockholders control a horizontally 
diversified group of firms – with some family firms in Asia holding horizontal 
interests in industries including flour milling, semiconductors, and banks – the 
portfolio gains from the good governance deal may be limited. 
 
Given these advantages (psychological benefits, tax evasion, and insider 
knowledge), why would private blockholders ever accept the “good governance 
deal” from FPI and tap stock markets? Though capricious, equity markets may 
provide the only means of raising capital for existing firms when a country’s 
banking market is shut down, as happened during the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Equity markets also provide the only means of raising capital for new 
entrepreneurs and for some knowledge-intensive industries, since banks are 
leery of start-up’s and are unable to evaluate the credit-worthiness of firms with 
intangible assets. In these cases, private blockholders may be strongly motivated 
to accept the governance deal despite a questionable trade-off between private 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the mid-1990’s. Until this analysis is repeated to provide at least a second set of more recent 
data points, it will not be clear how much ownership concentration has changed overall, and thus 
whether liquidation has taken place. 
 benefits and FPI valuation, as well as the undesirable attentions of the tax 
collector. Not surprisingly, the pioneers in adopting unilateral good governance 
practices in many of these markets have been high tech entrepreneurs, who 
often became the darlings of emerging market stock pickers at securities firms.   
 
If blockholders are motivated to accept the “good governance deal”, they still face 
a transactions problem in selling off ownership in small increments to foreign 
portfolio investors while recovering the control premium. For a smooth transition 
to take place, the blockholder must issue a credible promise not to steal from the 
firm, and the FPI’s must promise to compensate the blockholder for giving up 
those private benefits of control – in effect, paying a premium over the current 
value of traded minority shares in that firm. If done in small increments, the 
marginal transaction that transfers control from the blockholder to the new 
minority investor must carry a price that embodies all the private benefits of 
control – a big price tag. No rational minority investor will enter this transaction, 
since all the previous shares were acquired at the lower traded price. Yet without 
such a price premium, no rational blockholder will sell to the point where control 
is threatened.  
 
Unless this transaction problem is solved, blockholders’ support for the “good 
governance deal” may grind to a halt at the transfer of the 51st percent of control, 
leaving the private blockholder in charge and minority shareholders still exposed 
to expropriation. When private blockholders are motivated to sell, they may find it 
easier to trade ownership in large transactions to a foreign investor such as an 
MNC or a private equity fund that is able and willing to buy out the whole block at 
the necessary premium price. This becomes an FDI transaction, not FPI, and 
causes no efforts to reform governance institutions.
20  
 
Finally, if blockholders are motivated to accept the governance deal and find a 
way around the control transactions problem, they encounter two collective 
action problems that may explain their apparent inaction in supporting 
governance reforms. The first problem is trust. In a market dominated by other 
blockholders and with weak governance institutions to protect minority 
shareholders, what blockholder will be brave enough to go first, adopting good 
governance institutions that limit his own private benefits, and exposing himself 
to expropriation as a trusting minority shareholder?  
 
If the solution to “who goes first” is collective lobbying for governance reform 
through the industrial federation, which binds all blockholders to the same new 
rules, the private blockholders must contend for control of the business 
                                                            
20 The firm is then de-listed from the local exchange; it only reappears as a public company as 
part of the valuation of the acquiring MNC in a global capital market, or if the acquiring private 
equity fund re-lists the firm in some form, either locally or on a global capital market.  If it re-lists 
locally, of course, the private equity fund faces the same obstacles noted above. Data on this 
type of FDI, and especially on the behavior of private equity funds, rarely appears in public 
sources, though there is considerable anecdotal evidence of such transactions (and de-listing) in 
all of the countries in this sample.  
 federation with the professional managers of semi-privatized state-owned 
enterprises (SOE’s) and large manager-controlled firms. These are usually larger 
than private blockholder firms and more skilled at interfacing with the 
bureaucracy, and they tend to dominate the agenda of big business federations 
in many economies, exhibiting only limited sympathy for the efforts of private 
blockholders to change the governance rules to enrich themselves.   
 
The mixed motives of employee-managers with respect to the “good governance 
deal”, and their support for (or resistance to) governance changes, are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
6.  Tooth-and-Nail Resistance from Employee-Managers  
 
What are the benefits and costs of governance change from the perspective of    
employee-managers? For managers, the equivalent of private blockholders’   
benefits of control may include lavish compensation, luxurious perquisites,   
empire-building, investment in low-yield or high-risk projects, or preservation of 
“stable employment” at the expense of profitability. All of these translate into 
agency costs for the shareholders.
21 The good governance premium offered by 
FPI’s consists of reforming governance institutions specifically to reduce these 
agency costs. It is not surprising that governance changes evoke intense 
resistance from employee-managers.
22  Employee-managers control 90% of the 
firms in Japan, and the Japanese case provides extensive evidence of 
employee-managers striving to blunt corporate governance reforms.  
 
In Japan, the so-called zaibatsu conglomerates that flourished from the late 19
th 
Century through the 1920’s were originally controlled by family blockholders, who 
kept careful watch on their hired managers and emphasized profitability as well 
as growth. The Japanese state chipped away at these blockholdings during the 
1920’s and 1930’s, and the zaibatsu blockholdings were summarily wiped out by 
the Allied Occupation after World War II, leaving the managers in control. The 
family blockholdings of first-generation post-WWII entrepreneurs such as Akio 
Morita of Sony, the Matsushita’s, and the Toyota’s were diluted by a combination 
of generational taxation and shareholdings by financial institutions.
 The net result 
was to make employee-managers essentially unaccountable to anyone but 
themselves, and this is reflected in Japan’s corporate governance institutions.
  
 
Employee-managers assumed control of the big business “corporatist” entities 
such as the Federation of Economic Organizations, the keizai dantai rengokai (or 
Keidanren) and used these entities to resist governance reforms that endorsed 
                                                            
 
21 As noted by Shleifer and Vishny, “…poor managers who resist being displaced might be the 
costliest manifestation of the agency problem.” Shleifer and Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate 
Governance”, NBER Working Paper #5554, April 1996, page 10.  
22 This characterization of the preferences of employee-managers is not intended to impugn the 
personal integrity or professional motives of senior managers of firms, many of whom sincerely 
believe that they serve loftier goals than mere maximization of shareholder value.  
 the principle of maximizing shareholder value over goals such as market share, 
growth, or stable employment. For example, managers and the Keidanren 
repeatedly tried to water down or delay the tighter accounting rules and 
enhanced disclosure. In the face of calls for independent third-party audit, the 
Keidanren suggested instead some cosmetic changes regarding the role of the 
statutory auditor, or kansayaku – another insider. In response to increasing 
public criticism of insider boards in the late 1990’s, managers and the Keidanren 
deflected this into a debate over the merits of reducing board size rather than 
bring on a majority of NED’s.  These smaller boards under the so-called shikkô 
yakuin-sei or “executive manager system” served to strengthen the grip of     
employee-managers rather than making them accountable to shareholders. 
 
The principle of governance reform was also deflected by means of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum (JCGF).  The JCGF, strongly influenced by senior 
employee-managers, carefully divided its recommendations into those that 
should be implemented in short order (“step A principles”) and those that “should 
be aimed for in the early 21
st Century…or which require legal reforms on a grand 
scale” (“step B principles”).  The principle of a majority of outside independent 
directors was carefully designated as “step B,” meaning someday, but not now.
23 
Above all, the JCGF discarded the principle of shareholder value as the cardinal 
objective of a business firm, and condemned the sacrifice of “stable employment” 
in the pursuit of profit maximization.  
 
As endorsed by the JCGF and the Keidanren, entrenched managers and 
employees of Japanese firms - whose unions are organized on a firm rather than 
industry basis - have managed to preserve the no-lay-off policy at the expense of 
shareholders. The agency costs implicit in this policy for a sample of two-hundred 
Japanese firms is approximately $30 billion per year.
24 
 
Japan’s company law provides good minority shareholder protections, and a 
relatively straightforward mechanism by which potential blockholders could 
engage in contests for control. So far, such takeovers have been blocked by 
cross-shareholdings, so-called mochiai-kabu.
25 But mutual crossholdings as a 
                                                            
23 “Coporato Gabanansu gensoku: atarashii nihongata kigyô tôchi o kangaeru,” Coporaato 
Gabanansu Gensoku Sakutei Iinkai, Nihon Corporate Governance Forum, 5/26/98. The JCGF 
included a number of business economists as well as employee-managers. 
24 EVA measures the return on investment above the normalized costs of both debt and equity 
capital.
   EVA is useful comparative measure because it looks at the return on total capital 
employed, rather than just return on equity, and controls for differences in capital costs by 
measuring the spread between return and capital costs. Goldman Sachs did a ten year EVA 
analysis of Japan’s Nikkei 300 non-financial firms and found an average return on capital of 3.9% 
over the period 1989-96.
 Their estimate of the weighted cost of capital for these same firms 
during this period was 5.7%, meaning that the EVA spread of TSE1 firms was a negative 1.8% 
from 1989 through 1996, implying an annual agency cost to shareholders of about $30 billion 
over this period. Goldman Sachs Japan Research: EVA Analysis, May 1998. 
25 Japanese firms hold large blocks of non-traded securities on their balance sheet, including 
holdings in their main bank, a horizontal keiretsu, or vertical investments in subsidiaries and 
distributors. These securities are carried at purchase cost rather than market value, which had 
 percentage of total market capitalization have fallen from 52% in 1989 to 45% in 
1997, and are still plunging.
26  In order to stop the unwinding of passive equity 
cross-holdings, which could open up the prospect of contests for control given 
Japan’s straightforward voting rules, the Keidanren pushed for a variety of 
methods, employing tax changes and quasi-government entities to prop up stock 
prices and absorb these liquidated cross-holding shares.
27   
  
As with private blockholders, under what conditions would employee-managers 
find the FPI good governance premium an attractive option, given the risks posed 
by oversight and control reforms? Large publicly-traded firms in all economies 
generate most of their cash flow needs either internally (from retained earnings 
and depreciation) or from debt markets, issuing new stock. The only conditions 
under which employee-managers would turn to equity markets are when debt 
markets dry up, or if industrial consolidation forces them to engage in merger 
activity funded by stock.  
 
Japanese firms increased their use of equity markets during the various banking 
crises of the 1990’s, and they also issued new stock to fund many overseas 
acquisitions.  Because of a series of decisions by the SEC regarding the issuing 
conditions of American Depository Receipts (ADR’s) which imposed Anglo-
American standards of accounting and disclosure on foreign listing firms, but 
exempted such firms from complying with domestic standards of oversight or 
control rules, ADR listing became attractive for employee-managers of many 
non-U.S. multinational firms -- including state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) facing 
the prospect of large share initial public offerings (SIPO’s), as discussed in the 
next section.
 28 
                                                                                                                                                                             
created a cushion of unrealized capital gains. But these reserves are being rapidly liquidated to 
cover operating losses.    
26Goldman Sachs, Equity Derivatives Research: The Liquefaction of Japanese Crossholdings, 
September 1998. 
27 The Keidanren wanted a series of tax changes that would allow firms to swap each other’s 
mutual holdings without running these transactions through a market clearing mechanism, 
thereby keeping stock prices high and keeping stock out of the hands of potential third-parties. It 
also proposed a Securities Finance Corporation to equity cross-holdings from firms and then hold 
them in trust, using the shares as collateral for loans from the Bank of Japan. 
28 
 In the 1970’s the SEC drew a distinction between “hard” governance and “soft” governance 
issues for ADR listing rules.  Accounting and disclosure were “hard,” oversight and management 
were “soft,” while control fell somewhere in the middle. The SEC adopted a principle of home 
country deference regarding the soft institutions of internal firm governance, and a principle of 
firm disclosure to U.S. standards regarding the hard information institutions.  During the mid-
1980’s the U.S. market for control broke open and large Fortune 500 firms began to feel 
threatened by potential takeovers. Employee-managers of large U.S. firms lobbied to make 
hostile takeovers more difficult and expensive, resulting in a series of anti-takeover laws issued at 
the State, rather than Federal level (including a tightening of the Delaware statutes), and began 
experimenting with anti-takeover devices, including multiple classes of equity with different voting 
rights, in the European and Asian style.
   The SEC finally came down on the side of one-share 
one-vote in its ruling 19-C-4 in July of 1998, but with a specific exemption for foreign issuers on 
U.S. markets.  Home country deference  (or “carve-out’s” in SEC legalese) arose again in the 
1990’s, as cross-border tender offers and business combinations expanded. The SEC chose in 
October of 1999 to exempt such transactions from extra-territorial application of its own rules, 
  
Given the passivity of private blockholders and the resistance of employee-
managers to corporate governance reforms, the next question must be: how 
does the state as blockholder respond to the FPI “good governance deal”?    
 
7. Bringing the State Back In    
 
The state as blockholder exhibits what is known in the governance literature as 
“the owner’s incentive problem”. Though ownership of a state-owned industrial 
enterprise or bank is nominally held in the name of “the people,” as a practical 
matter SOE’s are controlled by bureaucratic agencies, often multiple agencies, 
under the ultimate control of politicians. Politicians have many objectives in 
addition to maximizing the value of “the people’s” blockholding of an SOE, and 
thus the state’s response to the FPI “good governance deal” reflects a mix of 
personal and public policy motives. SOE’s provide politicians with patronage, 
excess employment (for which they can take credit), and political contributions or 
outright bribes. These are the equivalent of the private benefits of control, against 
which politicians must weigh the appeal of the governance premium. 
  
These twelve cases suggest that politicians had two motives for embracing 
corporate governance reforms.  The floodtide of FPI into East Asia was 
paralleled by two profound events in the political economy of these states. The 
first event was the privatization process (or, more accurately, quasi-privatization 
process) by means of share initial price offerings of SOE’s. The second event 
was the soaring price tag of moral hazard losses in the banking sector, a cost 
picked up by the state as guarantor of the banking system.   
 
Both events forced politicians to make a choice between public fiscal pressure 
and their private benefits of SOE control. The FPI “good governance deal” 
provided a way out of the fiscal squeeze while retaining – at least for a while – 
most of the benefits of control.     
 
Cashing in on SOE’s 
 
Every country in this sample, including the Asian countries, witnessed a program 
of corporatisation and partial privatization of SOE’s, a program that began in the 
1980’s and picked up speed during the 1990’s, the period of financial 
globalization that is the focus of this paper.   The six Asian states raised a total of 
$68 billion in current dollar equivalents from the partial sale of state ownership in 
SOE’s during this period, as shown in Table 7. On average, these proceeds 
accounted for 1.3% of total central government expenditure for these states 
during the decade period: for those running a fiscal deficit during these years 
(which excludes Taiwan and Singapore) SIPO revenues plugged an average of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
based on its “Cross Border Release,’’ arguing that application of U.S. rules would only 
discourage the parties to such transactions from including shares held by U.S. residents in tender 
offers.
   
 22% of the government fiscal gap.  
 
Table 7:  SOE SIPO Revenues (1989-99) 
 
Country Offerings(#) Proceeds($bn)   Residual State Ownership (%) 
  
China   17   9.5    74 
Japan   6   42.8    38 
Korea   3   7.3    85 
Malaysia  5   3.8    94 
Singapore  11   2.6    71 
Taiwan  1   2.6    48 
 
Moreover, these data understate the importance of SIPO revenues to the state, 
since these SIPO’s freed the state from supplying capital funds to these 
“corporatised” SOE’s. After the state liquidated part of its holdings, these firms 
obtained additional capital themselves from secondary equity offerings, bond 
issues, and loan syndication’s, thereby reducing the cash-flow drain on the state 
budget and the state’s contingent liability as sovereign guarantor of their debts. 
Even more attractive from the standpoint of the state is that these revenues were 
“quick and easy” incremental revenue compared to raising taxes.    
  
As a result, the state in every country in this sample engaged in a partial sell-off 
of its blockholdings through SOE SIPO’s, a substantial block of which was 
acquired by FPI’s. In parallel, in four out of the six Asian cases, the state 
implemented a series of top-down governance reforms that enhanced minority 
shareholder protections to attract investors to these SIPO’s and maximize the 
state’s revenue stream from these offerings.  
  
In Malaysia the state raised 2% of its revenue and plugged 58% of its budget gap 
with SIPO’s totaling $3.7 billion over the same period.  Malaysia’s SIPO’s began 
with the sale of a 30% share in Malaysian Airlines in 1985, followed by larger 
transactions in Telekom Malaysia in 1990 and 1992, Tenaga National in 1992, 
Petronas in 1995, and Malaysia Airports in 1999. These SIPO’s also eased the 
ability of these firms to directly tap private debt markets - air transport, 
telecommunications, and petroleum being capital-intensive sectors - thereby 
easing the fiscal burden for the Malaysian state while it continued to pursue its 
state-directed growth strategy.  In parallel with these offerings, the state imposed 
a series of reforms in information, oversight, and management practices that 
gave Malaysia one of the highest conformance rankings in the twelve country 
sample.
   
 
The Korean government raised $42 billion from SOE SIPO’s over this decade, 
the lion’s share in the last two years, immediately following the Asian Financial 
Crisis. These proceeds plugged 16% of the state fiscal deficit, on average, during 
the decade, and were critical to meeting Korea’s fiscal commitments to the IMF 
 after the 1997-98 bailout, as discussed below. Although both POSCO and 
KEPCO had successfully engaged in partial SIPO’s in 1989, the series of 
governance reforms that brought Korea’s conformance levels rapidly from 0 in 
1994 to 4 in 1999 were necessary to make Korea’s less attractive SOE’s 
marketable in more demanding markets, after the implicit sovereign guaranty of 
the Seoul government had been largely tattered.  
 
The Chinese government began its strategy of corporatisation of SOE’s to raise 
revenue for the central government in Beijing, which was perpetually tax-starved, 
and to shift the continuing losses of the SOE’s out of the state-owned banking 
system by imposing a hard budget constraint, as SOE losses were estimated at 
4-5% of GDP. As a result of a string of SIPO’s during this decade, many SOE’s 
were removed from the central government’s books and brought in revenues 
equal to 1% of the central budget – thereby plugging 10% of the budget gap. In 
order to tap international equity markets, the state engaged in a series of top-
down reforms in information institutions and cosmetic changes in other 
governance practices, relying heavily on the experience of market regulators in 
Hong Kong.  
 
However, the state encountered stubborn resistance from entrenched employee 
managers, resulting in a combination of increasing agency and expropriation 
costs.  As the World Bank observed,  “As the nominal owners have only very 
limited control or even information about enterprise performance and asset use, 
control over Chinese SOE assets and cash flow rests increasingly with enterprise 
managers. The result of such a corporate governance vacuum is that managers 
(and other insiders) end up with de facto control over enterprises [resulting in] 
asset-stripping, poor investment decisions, decapitalization through excessive 
wage increases, and increase in other private benefits.”
 29 
 
Although the Japanese state raised $42 billion from SIPO’s during this decade, 
which are in turn traceable to fiscal pressures, there is little evidence linking 
these SIPO’s to specific governance reforms in Japan.  Japan was a pioneer 
among the OECD countries in the privatization of SOE’s, moving systematically 
to privatize a series of SOE’s during the 1970’s, well before the British and 
Chilean moves of the 1980’s. Though several of these SIPO’s were cross-listed 
on foreign exchanges, the compromises with FPI expectations about governance 
were minimal, as Japan had ample domestic savings and pliable financial 
institutions that could fully subscribe to these offerings. Although the data 
suggest that the MOF raised almost 10% of its revenue from SIPO’s during this 
period, it appears that relatively little of this came from foreigners, and the MOF 
retained its tight caps on foreign subscriptions in all of these transactions. There 
are, therefore, few signs of conformance to global standards as a result of fiscal 
pressure; most of Japan’s governance changes are traceable to the moral 
hazard problem, as discussed in the next section.  
                                                            
29 The World Bank, China’s Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder, 1997, 
page 51 
  
Singapore followed a similar path of partially privatizing its extensive state-owned 
sector, raising $2.6 billion from SIPO’s while adopting a set of governance 
practices that made these firms relatively attractive to foreign portfolio investors, 
who were enthusiastic buyers of these SIPO’s.  Singapore had established a 
track record of good governance practices with FPI’s as early as the mid-1980’s, 
when Neptune Orient and Singapore Airlines were groomed and then issued on 
international capital markets. Other pioneers in good governance were the string 
of high technology related SOE’s for which the Singapore government engaged 
in SIPO’s in the 1990’s, including Singapore Electronics & Engineering, 
Singapore Computer, Singapore Technologies, and Singapore Telecom.   
Notably, the state retained ultimate control in every issue. 
 
As Mak observes, “ At the end of the 1980’s, government linked corporations 
[GLCs] comprised 69% of total assets and 75% of profits of all domestically 
controlled companies in Singapore. In the 1990’s, through a program of 
privatization, which dispersed the equity of these companies, those numbers 
have been reduced. However, the government continues to hold majority 
ownership in these GLCs. In many ways, these companies form the bulwark of 
the domestic economy and are often seen as opinion leaders in the practice of 
management. Since many directors of GLCs are also senior government officials, 
it is an indirect method for controlling and monitoring corporate activities and 
business policies by the government.”
30 
 
Taiwan’s governance reforms, as in the case of Japan, are not directly traceable 
to SOE reforms, which only began in 1999, too recently to be picked up in the 
data used by this paper. Taipei’s sole SOE offering, a series of tranches in China 
Steel Corporation between 1991 and 1995 was not notable for its good 
governance practices.  
 
Moral Hazard Melt-Down’s 
 
The second event motivating these states to push governance reforms was the 
mounting price-tag of moral hazard losses in the financial sector during the 
1990’s in most of these countries. Corporate governance failures in the financial 
sector were one of the root causes of these losses, which were ultimately picked 
up by the state in these countries.  
  
Prudential regulators wrestled with the peculiar corporate governance problem of 
financial institutions, especially banks, in all of these countries. Each flavor of 
insider governance poses its own risk to the state as lender-of-last-resort.   
Private blockholders are prone to use banks as a private piggy-bank to fund their 
other enterprises: this occurred in Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The state 
                                                            
30 Mak Teen and Phillip Phan, “Corporate Governance in Singapore: Recent Developments for 
the Next Millenium”, National University of Singapore Working Paper, 
www.pes.org.ph/corpgov_sing.htm. 
 blockholder does such a poor job supervising managers of state-owned financial 
institutions and development banks that risk management fails and loan losses 
mount: this occurred in China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Banks 
controlled by employee-managers who are unaccountable to stockholders or an 
independent board also perform badly at risk management: this happened most 
spectacularly in Japan.   
 
Politicians and finance officials in these countries realized during the 1990’s that 
outsider governance combined with prudential regulation (to counter related party 
lending by private blockholders) could substitute market discipline for failed 
insider governance.
31 This motivated the state to undertake many of the reforms 
that boosted the compliance rankings in Table 4.  
  
For example, process-tracing of the burst of reforms in Korean corporate 
governance institutions in 1998 indicates that these reforms were rammed 
through by the newly-elected Kim Dae-jung government with a thin veneer of 
consultation with the blockholders, but essentially unilaterally by the state, under 
pressure from moral hazard losses during the Korean Financial Crisis. 
 
Non-bank financial intermediaries (or NBFI’s) controlled by the chaebol 
accumulated huge unhedged external liabilities during the 1990’s, liabilities 
incurred as they borrowed on foreign markets and re-lent to other members of 
the chaebol group, thereby demonstrating the risk of private blockholder insider 
governance of banks. These unhedged borrowings were one of the major causes 
of the 1997-98 Korean Financial Crisis. 
 
In a short period of time, the Korean government changed accounting to reflect 
the IAS, required third party audit (and increased the liability of accounting firms), 
enhanced disclosure requirements, and imposed the rule for a majority of 
independent directors on the boards of big firms, including the largest chaebol.
  
The state put its stamp on control institutions by changing the rules for takeovers 
and imposing a strategy of industrial consolidation - the so-called “Big Deal” 
policy - whereby the government dictated the terms of asset transfers between 
the chaebol, rather than leaving this to the blockholders or the market.
32 
 
Similarly, close examination of events in Japan suggests that moral hazard 
pressure was the prime mover behind reforms in accounting systems, standards 
setting, and third-party analysis.
33 The Ministry of Finance began to lose control 
                                                            
31 Jon Hartzell, Corporate Governance in International Financial Groups, Paper for the Seminar 
on Corporate Governance for Supervised Financial Institutions, Curacao, November 1996. 
32 The state kept a large percentage of troubled or illiquid firms on life-support under the Financial 
Supervisory Agency, including a great many of the smaller 6-64 chaebol, and effectively dictated 
the terms of change in control. 
33 Although Japan’s central government raised $42 billion from SIPO’s during the 1989-99 
decade, thereby plugging 6.4% of the budget gap, there is no evidence linking these SIPO’s to 
specific top-down changes in Japan’s corporate governance practices.  Aside from those firms 
that restated their financial figures in conformity with GAAP in order to cross-list on U.S. capital 
 over Japan’s monetary policy in the mid-90’s because of mounting concern over 
swelling bad debts in the banking system. As early as 1992, mid-level officials in 
the Ministry began to debate the need to tighten up the accounting system in 
response to mounting evidence of the moral hazard losses incurred during the 
excesses of Japan’s bubble asset inflation. In 1994, slack reserve accounting for 
potential loan losses allowed Japanese banks to report good profits and pay 
dividends even as their loan portfolios were deteriorating and both the real estate 
and stock markets continued to implode.
34  This was opposed by other officials, 
who believed they could ride out the banking crisis on the basis of economic 




The internal MOF debate over accounting institutions simmered until 1996-97.  
The first act in Japan’s extended banking crisis was being played out in the Diet 
during the first half of 1996, when the MOF was forced to go to the Diet for 685 
billion yen (about $6.5 billion) to rescue the Jusen housing loan firms.
  This 
caused a political firestorm and subjected the MOF to intense criticism for its 
complicity in slack accounting policies, adding impetus to the long-standing 
desire on the part of politicians to dismantle and reorganize the Ministry.
36    
 
A threshold was crossed in the last quarter of 1997, when a series of defaults by 
Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities caused 
Tokyo’s interbank market to freeze up, as the magnitude of the hidden losses 
from securities trading and the unreliability of reported financial figures became 
clear to market participants.
37 The Bank of Japan was forced to inject large 
amounts of liquidity to keep the financial system functioning.
38 MOF officials 
agreed that it was time to bite the accounting bullet; in any case economic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
markets, few concessions were made to minority investor protections in terms of disclosure, 
independent oversight, or managerial compensation. 
34 Takahashi Yoiichi, “The Truth behind Japanese Financial Crisis,” Princeton University 
manuscript, December 6, 1999.  
35 Because of the MOF’s “convoy” principle, whereby the MOF arranged for weak or failing banks 
to be absorbed by stronger banks, combined with the MOF’s implicit “no fail” guarantee, objective 
arms-length financial reporting data was unimportant for Japanese banks. Once stronger 
Japanese banks began to balk at these shotgun marriages, and foreign lenders began to 
question the MOF’s blanket guarantee, this began to change, and the lack of good data for 
“counter-party” credit analysis began to loom larger. See Curtis Milhaupt and Geoffrey Miller, 
“Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the Jusen 
Problem”, Law and Policy in International Business, Volume 29, 1997. 
36 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Weekly, “Volatile Jusen Issue: Finance Ministry Reform Looms 
after Resolution of Bad-loan Problem,” 2/12/96, page 1.  
37 This was made abundantly clear by third-party analysts, who rapidly downgraded the ratings of 
leading Japanese financial institutions and lead to a stinging “Japan premium” that these firms 
were required to pay in the international money markets. 
38 “Japanese financial markets clearly experienced a kind of credit crunch because of a rash of 
failures, declining asset prices, and growing mistrust of financial statements and regulators. That 
resulted in a further contraction of credit in what became a vicious cycle. In other words, 
unreliable financial statements had proved a serious impediment to the functioning of a market 
economy.” Mitsuhiro Fukao, Financial Crisis in Japan, October 26, 1999, Keio University 
manuscript, page 12.  
 recovery was stalled, and there was no end in sight for the banking crises.  The 
MOF arranged for the Business Accounting Discussion Council (BADC) or Kigyô 
Kaikei Shingikai, to rapidly approve a series of GAAP principles for valuation and 
accounting, with special attention paid to accounting principles for financial 
institutions. The MOF’s complicity in poor accounting continued to fester as a 
political issue in Japan, and it surfaced again in the reorganization debates that 
led to the creation of an independent BADC.
39 
 
The institutions that define the fiduciary responsibilities of both management and 
the board (for they are equivalent in Japan) were sharpened by a flurry of 
stockholder suits of both the derivative and the class action variety, many of them 
brought against banks and bank managers by minority stockholders outraged at 




Malaysia suffered moral hazard losses in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis 
and the Malaysian state began its own program of top-down reform, pointing the 
finger at the governance sins of private blockholders.  This reform was given a 
sharp political edge as the state was controlled by the United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO) and most of the private blockholders were ethnic-
Chinese.
41 In May 1998, the Securities Commission complained that “Private 
                                                            
39 Japan’s accounting standards-setting institution, the Kigyô Kaikei Shingikai  (Business 
Accounting Discussion Council, or BADC), formerly under the thumb of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF, now Zaimusho), was shifted to the new Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA). The FSA, 
JICPA, and Keidanren agreed to replace the BADC with a new standards-setting organ, 
independent of the Ministry, at least in principle, with a full-time staff and budget, to start 
functioning as of April 2001.
  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Weekly, “Accounting Standards to be 
set by Private Institution,” April 3, 2000, page 13, and Yasuhisa Shiozaki, “Nihon no kaikei seido 
ni shinrai o torimodoso” (“Time to Restore Faith in Japanese Accounting”), Toyo Keizai, May 
1999.  
40 The tightening of the fiduciary responsibility of boards of directors towards shareholders was 
the outcome of negotiations between the Keidanren and the Ministry of Justice regarding 
modifications of Japan’s commercial code in 1992-93 that reduced the filing requirements for 
plaintiffs who intended to bring suit against directors.
  Such suits had previously been deterred 
since plaintiffs were required to file a fee corresponding to a fixed percentage of the total claim: 
this required large sums to be deposited by the plaintiff for suits that could last five years or more. 
“[I]n a remarkable decision, the Tokyo High Court held in March 1993 that yen 8200 was the 
appropriate figure, thus creating a precedent that significantly changed the price of derivative 
actions….The court may have been influenced by the well-publicized impeding passage of the 
Commercial Code reform bill, which came only about 10 weeks after the court’s 
decision….Without the reform plan, the decision would have been truly surprising given the 
Japanese court’s usual reluctance to fashion new remedies and procedures.” Mark West, “The 
Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States”, Northwestern 
University Law Review, 88:1436 (1994), page 1465. 
41 Although concerned by moral hazard losses, the Malaysian state did not have entirely clean 
hands itself.   For example, losses in several well-connected bumiputra firms in 1997-98 resulted 
in a series of asset-stripping transactions and dubious changes in control, abetted by UMNO and 
at the expense of minority shareholders, which represented a significant step backwards in terms 
of governance reform in Malaysia. Examples include Renong Berhad’s merger (and bailout) by 
United Engineers (UEM) in 1997, the Petronas acquisition (and bailout) of KPB in 1998, and the 
Koperasi Usaha Bersatu purchase (and bailout) of Sime Bank assets in 1999.  
 sector initiatives in the area of corporate governance in Malaysia have been 
disappointing and responses in this area have largely been a government-led 
effort. Companies in Malaysia must therefore shed their lackadaisical attitude 
towards good corporate governance standards. They must take responsibility for 
setting appropriate standards for conduct within the broad regulatory framework 
established by the government.”
42 
 
This top-down reform project began with a High Level Finance Committee on 
Governance established by the MOF in March ’98, which unleashed a series of 
regulatory changes through the Securities Commission, the KLSE, the Registrar 
of Companies.
43 These changes led to the creation of a Malaysian Corporate 
Governance Code, the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, and the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group, whose power stemmed in part from 
equity holdings by government controlled funds.
44 The success of the Malaysian 
state in creating a fully-funded pension system provided it with both a motivation 
and a means to implement government reforms – a powerful motivation for 
supply-side reforms to corporate governance institutions, as discussed in the 
next section. 
   
How do these “supply side” pressures to change corporate governance interact 
with the pressures imposed by moral hazard losses and SOE’s? Although the 
evidence from this twelve country sample supports the argument that the state 
ownership is the prime mover in corporate governance reforms, it still leaves the 
state’s motives for reform causally overdetermined, as reforms can be traced to 
three events.
45 Which of these motives are most important from the standpoint of 
predicting the state’s support for reforming corporate governance institutions? 
 
 When they do hit the budget, moral hazard losses  are much larger than SOE 
operating losses. They are also must more difficult to solve, involving unpleasant 
taxation or budgetary choices for politicians; moreover, whatever solution is 
adopted takes a long time to work out.  In contrast, SOE privatization not only 
“solves” the drag of SOE losses on the budget, it also brings in revenue to help 
resolve the other two problems, and it does so quickly.  It is not surprising that 
SOE privatization has the most direct and quickest impact on corporate 
governance change, at least with regard to information and management 
institutions.  
 
                                                            
42 “Private Sector Initiatives Disappointing”, The Star (Malaysia), May 5, 1998, page 1.  
43 “Crusade for Better Governance,” New Straits Times, 5/04/99, page 13.   
44 “Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group looking for a Suitable Model”, Bernama News 
Agency, 8/16/99.  
45 All three motives stem from state ownership, either direct or indirect. State ownership of SOE’s 
is direct insofar as the MOF is usually the blockholder of record. The state’s ownership role in the 
financial sector is usually indirect, until the banks default and the state steps in with a rescue or 
recapitalization package. The state’s role in pension plans is also indirect, although the state 
becomes the plan principal when the gap between pension assets and pension claims is plugged 
with tax revenues.  
 The temporal primacy of SOE privatization, combined with the preferences of 
politicians discussed earlier, also helps explain the pattern of change between 
institutions. The overall conformance level for information and management 
institutions is much higher than for oversight and control practices.  The state 
could reap SOE SIPO’s on the basis of improved accounting and audit practices, 
with nominal changes in oversight, but without relinquishing control of these firms 
to value-maximizing outside directors.  The employee-managers and directors of 
these firms (bureaucrats or political appointees) were compensated with stock 
options – pioneering the use of stock options in many of these countries.  Hostile 
takeovers by a value-maximizing acquirer were blocked by anti-takeover and 
voting rule obstacles. 
  
In all twelve countries (except China) SOE SIPO’s were accompanied by careful 
consultation with labor unions.  This is consistent with the empirical literature on 
privatization, which indicates that post-privatization lay-off’s are limited to either 
“transition” or lower-income developing countries.
46 Nor is there much evidence 
that agency or expropriation costs declined after SIPO’s.
47 Though the literature 
suggests that there are substantial performance improvements in post-SIPO 
SOE’s, including greater output per employee and reduce leverage, it is not clear 
that this is due to lower expropriation costs by the state blockholder. In every 
country example, the state adopted changes in information institutions, in part to 
obtain the revenues from SOE SIPO’s, but drew the line at changes in oversight 
practices or control institutions that would open these “privatized” firms to the 
discipline of a market for control.   
 
There is little evidence that post-SIPO SOE’s have boards composed of 
independent outsiders; perusal of a random sample of SOE share offering 
memoranda reveals boards filled with serving or retired government officials, 
politicians, and labor union representatives, with a small sprinkling of managers 
of large firms. More importantly, the state retains, on average, at least 50% of the 
voting rights in SOE’s after the SIPO and several rounds of secondary offerings. 
This commanding blockholding, combined with various “golden share” and formal 
veto rights, effectively buffers these firms from any chance of a successful 
contest for control. 
  
The dynamics of SOE privatization are less successful in explaining variation in 
governance conformance among countries, as opposed to variation among 
institutions. What differs among these states that would explain their varying 
reactions to these three pressures for governance change? 
 
Classifying countries on the basis of whether they exhibit a so-called 
“developmental state” has little explanatory power.
48 Half the countries in the 
                                                            
46 William Megginson, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatisation”, 
Journal of Economic Literature (forthcoming), pages 32-34.  
47 Megginson, op. cit.  
48 There is a contentious and unresolved debate about what constitutes a “strong” or “activist” 
 sample had (at least until recently) an activist state – Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, France – but this does not correlate with the conformance 
rankings in Table 4.   
 
Nor does the notion of a “corporatist state”, with consultative decision-making 
between Big Business and Big Labor under the guiding eye of the state, explain 
variations in conformance on the basis of the argument that employee-managers 
and labor unions make common cause against profit-maximizing blockholders in 
order to resist the FPI good governance deal.
49 Corporatist traditions are 
increasingly tattered in all of these countries; even for those in which it remains 
partly functional, some rank high in conformance (Singapore, Germany), some in 
the middle (Netherlands), and others quite low (Japan).  
 
Classifying countries on the basis of external financial constraints also has limited 
value in explaining variation in conformance levels. Although all EU member 
states were subjected to the same Maastricht fiscal caps, they varied 
considerably in their rankings, from 4 to 7.  Only Korea was subjected to direct 
IMF pressures for governance reform (Malaysia demurred from an IMF bailout 
during the Asian Financial crisis), and yet process-tracing shows ample domestic 
motives for the changes that took place.  
 
There may simply be too little information in a sample of six countries to develop 
a testable hypothesis about the why some Asian states were more proactive than 
others in pushing through corporate governance reforms.  This is a promising 
area of future research, armed with a larger sample and a finer analytic scalpel. 
 
 
8. Conclusions and Implications 
  
The picture that emerges of changes in corporate governance institutions in 
these cases is considerably at variance with the notion of market-driven 
convergence, whereby price incentives offered by FPI’s gradually bring all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
state in the literature. See Kent Calder, Strategic Capitalism: Private Business and Public 
Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance, Princeton University Press, 1993; Ha-joon Chang, "An 
Institutionalist Perspective on the Role of the State - Towards an Institutionalist Political 
Economy", forthcoming in L. Burlamaqui, A. Castro, and H-J. Chang (eds.), Institutions and the 
Role of the State, Edward Elgar, 2000; Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State 
Intervention in Britain and France. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Stephen Haggard, 
Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration, The Brookings Institution, 1996; and 
Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization, Princeton University Press, 1990. 
49 See Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin, “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,” 
paper presented at the European Corporate Governance Network, 10/99. Pagano and Volpin’s 
model describes how an equilibrium set of corporate governance institutions emerges from 
political bargaining among three parties: blockholders, minority investors, and workers, 
institutions which allow blockholders to extract expropriations costs and employee-managers to 
extract agency costs, both at the expense of minority investors.  
 
 countries and all institutions smoothly into line with global governance standards. 
Private investors set up the price inducements for adopting minority investor 
protections, but the mixed pattern of formal and informal changes, as well as the 
pivotal role of the state in these country examples, suggests a picture more 
complex than that of many atomized private parties interacting in anonymous 
markets.   
 
Although the direction of change is monodirectional, towards greater minority 
shareholder protections, the path is uncertain. Convergence is not a sure thing; 
shallow convergence on information and management institutions appears more 
likely, with less change in terms of oversight or control. The speed with which 
change takes place and the sequence in which governance institutions change 
varies considerably, country by country, depending upon the preponderant 
ownership type, and on the actions of the state.   
  
These conclusions are subject to three research caveats. First, the FPI “good 
governance premium” rests on a combination of anecdotal and survey evidence. 
Because of the lumpy nature of country institutions, and the relatively small 
sample, it is hard to estimate these preferences statistically.  On-going work to 
refine these preferences using valuation proxies such as Tobin’s Q for a larger 
sample of countries, and a more systematic survey of FPI’s, may resolve this 
problem.
50  Secondly, the conformance rankings in Table 4 rely on subjective 
assessments, and provide static snapshot of institutions rather than tracking a 
moving target.  Thirdly, the data on ownership type in Table 5 are reconstructed 
from a hodge-podge of primary sources, often with different methods, and the 
underlying primary data is incomplete and static.    
 
Setting aside these caveats, the findings from this twelve country sample have 
several novel implications for political economy theory and for practical public 
policy. 
  
The scholarly debate over whether there are one, or many, versions of capitalism 
may be clarified by viewing institutional formation through the more parsimonious 
lens of ownership type. Ownership determines where the potential income 
cleavages run in response to international inducements and pressures, and the 
shifting terms of state ownership are a key determinant. In order to predict how 
these cleavages affect policy outcomes, political science and international 
relations theorists may have better results using the ownership hypothesis when 
examining the effect of exogenous forces on domestic choices.
51   
                                                            
50 FPI’s themselves may not be monolithic in their institutional preference. There is some 
evidence that the investment time horizon and therefore the preferences of pension funds, mutual 
funds, and money managers in different asset classes varies, in which case the composition of 
the FPI in each country market would have to be disaggregated in order to assess its influence 
with regard to governance. See Brancato, op.cit. 
51 See Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” International Organization 42 (1988), 
427-60 and Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations, 1997. 
   
A great deal of ink has been spilled in the political economy literature creating 
elaborate taxonomies of “stakeholder versus shareholder capitalism”, “producer 
versus consumer capitalism”, and even “Nippo-Rhenish versus Anglo-American 
capitalism” in order to explain contrasting institutions and policy outcomes. 
However, these findings suggest a mundane question of “who gets the money?” 
may provide a more parsimonious explanation.
52 In an early study of how 
external economics affects domestic institutions, Zysman focused on the 
structure of the banking system as the key explanatory variable, arguing that “by 
knowing the financial system one can predict the nature of the process of 
adjustment.”
53 These twelve cases suggest the paraphrase “by knowing the 
ownership type one can predict the nature of the process of adjustment.”
54  
 
As for the debate on whether non-state actors matter in policy outcomes, the 
corporate governance example proves unambiguously that they do: the state’s 
mediation of financial inducements offered by FPI determine the shifting pattern 
of corporate governance around the world. As a result of the FPI tidal wave and 
higher ratios of stock market valuation to GDP in all of these countries, the state 
and foreign investors are locked in an uneasy embrace that either party would 
find expensive to relinquish.
55 
 
The  corporate governance example suggests that convergence to a global 
standard of governance is not a “race to the bottom,” in which the state that 
deregulates fastest wins by attracting the most capital at the lowest cost.
56 On 
the contrary, the state with the most impartial, efficient protection of minority 
                                                            
52 See Berger and Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism, 1996; Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, Contemporary Capitalism: the Embedded ness of Institutions, 1997; and Michel Albert, 
Capitalism vs. Capitalism, 1993, all of which speculate on institutional divergence or convergence 
as a function of many variables, including the state, but not as a function of ownership type.  
53 John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change, 1983, page 91.  
54 Traditional political science terms such as Business and Labor are poor predictors of who wins 
and who loses in response to exogenous influences such as FPI.  As demonstrated by these 
twelve cases,  “Business” can represent any one of three different ownership groups – private 
blockholders, state blockholders, or employee-managers – with radically different institutional 
preferences.  
55The state cannot sit down with FPI’s and “hammer out a deal” regarding the terms and 
conditions of corporate governance.  This contrasts to bank debt markets, in which the MOF can 
sit down with a dozen or so big banks and work out an agreement on, say, debt swaps in a crisis. 
It is also unlike FDI markets, in which the state can summon the investor and negotiate (from a 
position of considerable strength) the terms of the deal. FPI’s face the inverse problem of 
collective action in responding to the state. There are many of them, with heterogeneous 
preferences. They are limited in their ability to flee from a given country: rapid exit incurs high 
transactions costs, especially during a financial crisis, and they are increasingly constrained in 
exit by the practice of portfolio indexing: for example, the top 25 U.S. institutional investors use 
indexing to manage 60% of their equity portfolio.
 Once committed to such an index, for example, 
investors are predisposed to leave a given percentage of their portfolio in a given country market: 
if they don’t like the corporate governance standards, they must work to improve them. 
56 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? 1997. 
 shareholder rights is the one that wins by attracting the most capital at the lowest 
cost.   
 
The spread of Anglo-American style corporate governance is not equivalent to 
deregulation, for capital markets are embedded in a set of sophisticated formal 
and informal institutions: in many respects the market-ordering Anglo-American 
model requires more institutional support than private-ordering or state-ordering 
models.
57  Nor is it a simple process of re-regulation, whereby the state uses a 
different set of tools to pursue the same objectives, as interventionist bureaucrats 
attempt to harness equity markets to their existing developmental model.
58 
Instead, it results in para-regulation, with a shift of authority to investors above 
the level of the state, combined with a greater shift of authority to independent 
statutory regulatory agencies below the state level. 
59   
 
Explanations of institutional changes in response to global markets do not require 
the invocation of “American hegemony” or similar notions of state power that 
frequently pop up in discussions of globalization.
60 The spread of the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance has little or nothing to do with policy 
goals of the United States government; FPI markets and sovereign states are the 
key actors in bringing about governance changes, at least in this twelve country 
sample. Any influence acquired by the state in Washington or London as a result 
has been obtained the same way that Britain acquired its global Empire, “in a fit 
of absentmindedness” rather than by design.
61 In any case, quasi-independent 
para-regulatory entities such as the FASB or the NYSE are a poor policy tool for 
central governments, difficult to harness to a foreign policy goal.  
 
From a policy standpoint, “reforms” to corporate governance institutions, 
particularly in emerging markets, must be careful to deal with agency and 
expropriation costs in balance. Governance institutions ex ante the introduction 
of FPI are complementary, and they rely on each other to mitigate, if not 
eliminate, both expropriation and agency costs.
62 Changing just one institution at 
                                                            
57 The complexity of the Anglo-American governance model should give pause to the 
conventional wisdom assumption that the Anglo-American model is easier to imitate than 
Japanese or German models, which require “idiosyncratic” governance institutions. See Bernard 
Black, “Creating Strong Stock Markets by Protecting Outside Shareholders,” paper for the OECD 
Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia, March 3-5, 1999, pages 6-7.  
58 Steven Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial 
Countries, 1996.   
59 The Anglo-American model is based on securities regulation by quasi-independent agencies 
such as the SEC, accounting rules by semi-private bodies such as the FASB, and enforcement of 
minority rights and fiduciary responsibility by independent common-law courts, rather than by 
Ministries of Finance or Ministries of Justice.   
60 See for example Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 1987, and 
The Challenge of Global Capitalism, 2000, or Loriaux, op.cit.  
61 "We [the English] seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of 
absence of mind." Sir John Seeley, The Expansion of England, 1883. 
62 Heinrich, Ralph. 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance: A Survey of the 
Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Paper No. 947, Kiel Institute of World 
Economics, Kiel, Germany. 
 a time, without examining the question of complementarity, may have 
undesirable effects.  
 
For example, efforts to reduce expropriation costs by improvements in NED 
oversight, which in effect levy a heavy “tax on entrepreneurs”, may blunt the 
ability of private blockholders to discipline managers.
  The unintended 
consequences of these reforms can be soaring agency costs – with entrenched 
employee-managers now free to manage badly. Indeed, in the corporate 
governance debate in some countries, calls to “professionalize” managers are 
often a code phrase for “reduce the influence of blockholders.” Conversely, 
efforts to reduce agency costs - changes that open the door to free-for-all 
takeover contests - may result in high expropriation costs, as blockholders 
emerge to discipline (or expropriate) employee-managers and, in the process, 
compensate themselves for these efforts at the expense of minority 
shareholders.
63   
  
In terms of industrial organization, convergence may halt at shallow equilibrium, 
with potentially unpleasant consequences for product/market competition. States 
are extremely sensitive to the potential fall-out from hostile takeovers. Even if 
states gradually adopt a para-regulatory approach to supervising corporate 
governance, this will not necessarily change the political disincentives associated 
with market-based contests for control, or make these states more willing to 
expose corporatised SOE’s to such contests. As noted earlier, the pattern of 
conformance has stopped well short of accepting market-based contests for 
control in ten out of twelve of these cases. 
64 
 
States’ distaste for such contests, particularly for the corporatised SOE’s that 
now account for such a large weight of their stock market capitalization, suggests 
that one result of the SOE corporatisation trend in the late 1980’s and 1990’s 
may be higher agency costs. Because of remaining state majority control, or 
because of voting restrictions or “golden shares” imposed by Ministries of 
Finance, the managers of these firms are likely to become more entrenched and 
less disciplined by the threat of hostile takeover’s, while strengthening their 
“stakeholder” common cause with the rest of the SOE workforce – especially if 
that workforce is unionized and politically mobilized.
65 They may also engage in 
                                                            
63Blockholders can expropriate employees by breaking implicit contracts on the sharing of the 
firm’s “quasi-rents” or simply by looting their pension funds (as in the Robert Maxwell scandal).  
See Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-
First Century, 1995. 
64The two examples of hostile takeovers discussed above, the Vodafone-Mannessmann 
transaction in Germany and the Olivetti-STET transaction in Italy, may not indicate a fundamental 
change in those two countries. 
65 The “grabbing hand” model developed by Shleifer and Vishny suggests that in many cases 
politicians can extract as many private benefits from SOE’s that are partially or even fully 
privatized as long as they can retain control over the profits of the firm through discretionary 
regulations.
 Depending on the degree to which corruption is tolerated, they will take these private 
benefits in cash or in terms of excess employment for favored unions or regions.  Shleifer and 
Vishny, The Grabbing Hand, pages 176-78.  
 classic empire-building by acquiring other firms at above-market prices, while 
being protected from such take-overs themselves by the state, and insulated 
from the financial market discipline that otherwise makes such acquisitions 
dangerous to the employee-managers.
66 
 
The minority shareholders of these firms, domestic and foreign alike, are unlikely 
to be cheerleaders for continued deregulation, if it poses a threat to the earnings 
(rents) of the largest stocks by value. This may lead to a new “shallow 
equilibrium”, with states and FPI’s aligned with entrenched employee-managers - 
all three of whom now resist further deregulation and competition, and jointly 
collect respective portions of the rents.
67 In this way, an unintended consequence 
of SIPO’s and increasing FPI may be a roadblock erected in the path of 
continued product-market deregulation, while encouraging inefficient acquisitions 
and cross-border mergers.   
 
This process could quickly become politically contentious, not just domestically, 
but across borders as well. There is already considerable political fallout within 
Europe as corporatised SOE’s spar with each other in attempts at cross-border 
acquisition and consolidation. The process of consolidation among “national 
champions” is even more delicate in Asia, as witnessed by the squabbles 
between Singapore Telecom, Malaysia’s Time Telecom, and Hong Kong 
Telecom.  In both regions, hostile cross-border contests can rapidly escalate into 
high politics.  At that point, states may realize that they have adopted, more or 
less by default (if not in a “fit of absentmindedness”) a set of market-driven 
Anglo-American corporate governance institutions without having forged the 
domestic political consensus to deal with the consequences.  
 
However, demographics and increased competition in financial markets will keep 
the process moving forward, albeit in fits and starts. As states begin to fund their 
pension systems, and as households and firms assert more control over their 
pension assets, this places more pressure on pension fund managers to seek 
                                                            
66 “Golden shares prevent that bad bidders become good targets. In an unconstrained control 
market an acquirer that failed to achieve synergy would run into difficulties and would become a 
prey of other companies. Golden shares protect potential bad bidders. Partial public ownership 
also protects potentially bad acquirers, since governments may value control of the company for 
political reasons more than cash flows derived from selling ownership rights. There seems to be 
an asymmetry in that some firms still controlled by the public sector (through partial ownership or 
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home. The Spanish government vetoed the merger between KPN and Telefónica and the Italian 
government vetoed the merger between Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telekom.” Francesc Trillas, 
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Control of Telecommunications Firms in Europe, paper for the 
Regulation Initiative, August 2000, www.london.edu/ri, page 7.   
67 A shift on either the supply or demand side of this equation could upset equilibrium at shallow 
convergence. On the supply side, FPI’s could tire of swelling agency costs at corporatised SOE’s, 
driving the stock price of these firms to embarrassing lows. On the demand side, fiscal pressure 
on the state could force it to liquidate the balance of its equity holdings in these firms. Either 
factor could lead to a contest for control of these SOE’s, whereby private blockholders buy out 
the state’s interest in private transactions, gobbling up bits and pieces of the former “national 
champions” and natural monopolies, or engaging in nasty public contests for control.   
 higher returns domestically and abroad.  These changes in pension plans will 
mobilize a huge amount of previously passive savings into active equity 
investment, especially in Japan and continental Europe. Active equity investment 
leads to a more systematic use of the governance discount (or premium).  This 
suggests that regulations regarding the structure and function of pension plans 
are a central issue of public policy, with enormous long term consequences for 
equity markets generally and for corporate governance specifically. Pension plan 
reforms may turn out to be the tail that wags the corporate governance dog. 
 
Retrospectively, the explosive growth of assets managed by institutional 
investors in the United States and the United Kingdom during the three decades 
between 1970 and 2000 caused Anglo-American investors to became serious 
players in international equity markets during the 1990’s, thereby providing the 
price incentives for adopting the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance.
68 Looking forward, as states increasingly permit domestic savings to 
freely enter the FPI pool, these minority shareholder protections will lose their 
“Anglo-American” appellation, the para-regulatory practices that support these 
protections will spread, and countries may be impelled from shallow to full 
convergence.    
                                                            
68 This growth was driven by tax changes (such as 401-k plans) and rules regarding private 
pension plans such as the ERISA statutes.  
  




China’s experiment with publicly-traded firms and stockmarkets is only a decade 
long, and – in a country that is still nominally Communist – not particularly 
friendly towards FPI’s.  As Walter and Howie point out, “In China the markets are 
operated by the State, regulated by the State, legislated by the State, raise funds 
for the benefit of the State by selling shares in enterprises owned by the State.  
No doubt there is some self-conflict in this.  In the entire system, the only things 
which do not belong to the state are the actual money, or capital, put up by 
predominantly individual investors and the market itself.”
69  
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires all Chinese firms 
that are publicly traded to use a common Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) 
that resembles IAS and GAAP, but differs on key points such as the treatment of 
debt, asset valuation, and revenue recognition principles. The Ministry of Finance 
issued the “Provisional Accounting Regulations for Joint-Stock Limited 
Enterprises” in 1992, which served as the foundation for CAS, with subsequent 
refinements and modifications. CAS itself replaces an arcane and unwieldy 
previous accounting system that varied by industrial sector, originally developed 
for government monitoring of firms, rather than management decision-making or 
investment analysis. All Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong, New York, or other 
international exchanges must use IAS, as a reconciliation to GAAP or IAS is 
mandated by listing authorities.   
 
The CSRC requires that listed firms use a third-party auditor to verify financial 
statements.  The MOF began to license CPA’s and accounting firms in 1993 
when it issued a regulation on “Professional Qualifications of CPA Firms,” This 
regulation began a process of creating auditing firms from the accounting 
sections of government financial bureaux, establishing professional standards 
under the aegis of the China Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), 
and formal licensing by the MOF.
70 Aside from the Big Five and their local 
affiliates, there are 4500 accounting firms in China, but only 106 are licensed by 
the MOF.  The domestic market share of the Big Five has risen from almost zero 
in 1990 to approximately 10%.  All listings on the Hong Kong and New York 




                                                            
69 Carl Walter and Fraser Howie, To Get Rich is Glorious! China’s Stock Markets in the ‘80’s and 
‘90’s (forthcoming), page 10.  
70 China Securities and Regulatory Commission, Information Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance in China, paper for the OECD Conference on Corporate Governance, Hong Kong, 
pages 8-10.  
   
China’s mandatory supervisory committee, similar in function to Germany’s 
Aufsichsrat, is irrelevant to governance in China, being effectively a rubber-stamp 
for the board of directors. Between 80% and 90% of the board members of 
Chinese SOE’s are non-executives (meaning non-employees), but the majority 
are concurrently government employees, at one level of government or another, 
and thus serve the state’s interest rather than any notion of fiduciary obligation to 
all shareholders.
71 In an analysis of 154 firms traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges, Xu and Wang found that 50% of directors were state 
employees, and another 40% were employees of state-controlled “legal persons,” 
an ambiguous category that includes other SOE’s and state-owned banks.
72 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are few independent directors on the 
boards of public Chinese firms. 
 
The nominal rules regarding voting rights and contests of control in Chinese 
Company Law are straightforward in terms of protecting minority rights in 
principal, but disclosure, notification, and voting procedures make it very difficult 
in practice for minority shareholders to exercise those nominal rights. More 
important, minority shareholders are placed in a different class with regard to 
ownership rights than shares held by state entities, and a result, China has a 
bewildering variety of share types, the net result of which is to nullify the control 
rights of minority investors in general and foreign investors in particular.
73 In 
addition, external and foreign ownership caps effectively rule out the prospect of 
contests for control of SOE’s. The state continues to hold, on average, 65% of 
the equity of traded SOE’s, and on average only 35% of the equity is tradable as 
either A or B shares. Moreover, foreigners are only allowed to trade B shares. 
Merger and acquisition activities involving large SOE’s have been engineered by 
the state for industrial policy reasons, or to palliate moral hazard losses in the 
state-owned banking sector. 
  
There are performance contracts for senior managers, but these are subject to 
political interpretation and intervention.  Some steps have been taken towards 
incentive compensation for managers in some big SOE’s, but these are small, 
with little disclosure, and it is unclear how they are tied to firm performance or 
shareholder value; anecdotal evidence suggests that around 2% of their total 
compensation is based on incentive compensation.  These performance bonuses 
                                                            
71 Ironically, China’s company law explicitly forbids government employees to serve as SOE 
directors. 
72 Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm’s 
Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies, World Bank paper, May 1997, page 32.  
73 “…the regulations were imbued with the spirit of state planning, state control, and state interest. 
This is best seen in the very definition of shares which proceeded based on who owned them 
rather than on the particular economic rights they might represent in a company.  Thus, if an 
agency of the government owned the shares, the shares were state shares, if a state enterprise 
with legal person status owned them they were legal person shares, and so on. Shares were 
given names based on the relationship of the particular owner to the State and it is absolutely 
amazing how many permutations of this relationship came to light over the next few years.”   
Walter and Howie, op.cit., page  42.  
 are swamped by the huge, across-the-board salary “bonuses” that are often 
awarded to the employees of SOE’s regardless of the performance of the firm.  A 
survey of 680 SOE’s between 1980 and 1994 “…shows hat among the profit-
losing enterprises in the sample period, on average, more than 80% of them 
issued extra bonuses, i.e. bonuses at least 25% of the basic wage bill…In other 
words, over one third of financial losses could be avoided had the insiders of 
those state enterprises been prevented from distributing extra bonuses for 
themselves.”




Japanese institutions of accounting are moving fitfully towards international 
accounting standards (IAS), especially with regard to consolidation and asset 
valuation, but as yet fall well below conformance with global standards.  Until 
1999 Japanese firms continued to report on an unconsolidated basis, thereby 
allowing firms to “park” losses at unconsolidated affiliates. Japanese accounting 
practices also allowed Japanese firms to carry assets at book rather than market 
value, permitting managers to avoid recognizing losses on deflated real estate or 
securities holdings – a serious issue in the aftermath of Japan’s post-Bubble 
asset collapse. Fiscal year 2001 promises to be a revolution in Japanese 
financial reporting, as firms must report fully consolidated balance sheets, use a 
mark-to-market basis for asset valuation, recognize unfunded pension liabilities 
on their balance sheets, and generally disclose much more data than before.  
 
Despite improved accounting standards, Japanese firms are still under no 
obligation to use external auditors, much less one of the Big Five accounting 
firms, to sign off on their figures.
 Instead, cosmetic changes have been made to 
the role of the internal auditor, or kansayaku, that marginally improve the internal 
auditor’s standing with regard to management, but that still fall far short of 
independent external auditing by global standards.
  Yet demand for the services 
of Big Five accounting firms in Tokyo exploded, as foreign-affiliated lenders and 
potential acquirers of Japanese assets engaged their services to validate the 
shaky data provided by potential acquisition targets in Japan.  
 
There has been little movement towards creating independent, outside boards of 
directors in Japan, where employees dominate the boards: 80% of Japanese 
corporations have no outside board members, another 15% have no more than 
two outside directors, who are usually affiliated parties.
75 A handful of firms have 
announced reductions in the size of their boards, in some cases splitting the 
board into a supervisory board on top, in charge of strategy, and an executive 
board below, in charge of operations.  But there has been little progress in the 
                                                            
74 David Li, “Insider Control, Corporate Governance, and the Soft Budget Constraint: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy Implications", in B.Chen, J. Dietrich, and Y.Fang, Financial Market Reform 
in China: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 2000, page 372. 
 
75 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (1995), pages 272-273.  
 key area of bringing independent outsiders onto the boards, much less ceding 
them control over audit or compensation committees.  However, the institutions 
that define the fiduciary responsibilities of both management and the board (for 
they are equivalent in Japan) have been sharpened by a flurry of stockholder 
suits of both the derivative and class action variety.
76  
 
No change has taken place in terms of Japan’s formal control institutions for 
shareholder rules and minority protections: the rules embedded in Japan’s long-
established commercial code to provide nominal protection for the rights of 
minority shareholders (including FPI’s) are superior to those in many other 
markets.
77  More importantly, no change has occurred in Japan’s informal control 
institutions, despite a large number of tempting targets whose market 
capitalization is much less than their asset book value and a set of formal control 
institutions that should make takeovers fairly straightforward. Japanese 
institutional investors, such as trust banks, insurance companies, and pension 
fund managers, do not tender their shares in hostile takeovers.  
 
There are only two recent departures from this solid wall of indifference to the 
merits of (and financial gains available from) an active control market. Cable & 
Wireless managed to acquire a majority of the unlisted shares of IDC in 1999, to 
complete what was essentially a foreign direct investment (FDI) transaction, and 
M&A Consulting failed to obtain a majority of the listed (and steeply undervalued) 
shares of Shoei, a Canon affiliate. One has to go back more than a decade, to T. 
Boone Picken’s failed attempt to obtain a board seat after purchasing a sizeable 
minority stake in Koito Manufacturing, to find another example of a hostile 
takeover attempt in Japan. 
 
The managers of large Japanese public firms continue to be either promoted 
from within, meaning selected by their predecessors and chairmen, or in some 
cases to step down from a senior government post, as an amakudari official.  
These managers are increasingly immune to being fired for poor performance; 
once ensconced, there is no way to remove the president short of a palace 
revolt.  Miyajima’s probit analysis shows that the turnover of Japanese senior 
managers as a function of financial performance has been steadily declining over 
the five periods of his study (from 1959 through 1993), which the author 
                                                            
76 For example, in April 1997 the Takashimaya board settled a shareholder suit with a payment of 
170m yen in restitution for breach of their fiduciary duties. In the same month similar suits were 
filed against the boards of Daiwa Bank and Sumitomo Shoji, and the next month suits were 
brought against Nomura Securities and Midori Juji.  On December 2000, the former management 
of bankrupted Sogo Department store was assessed a fine of 11.2 billion yen (about $100 
million) for poor management and fraud, under Japan’s new Corporate Rehabilitation Law. 
“Tokyo District Court Rules that Former Management of Group had failed to Perform their 
Duties”, Financial Times, 12/11/00.  
77 Carl Kester, Japanese Takeovers: The Global Contest for Corporate Control (1991), page 97. 
Certain filing and pre-notification requirements for undertaking a tender offer make it more difficult 
and expensive to engage in contests for control, but these requirements are comparatively less 
limiting than the U.S. state-level anti-takeover statutes that were passed in the early 1990’s. 
 attributes to the declining ability of Japanese banks to monitor these firms.
78  
 
Japanese top managers still have the lowest ratio of incentive compensation to 
total compensation of any state in the present sample set: only 9% of total 
managerial compensation, which includes both cash bonuses and stock options, 
is tied to the financial performance of the firm.
79   This is despite regulatory 
changes in 1997 that made it easier for firms to issue stock options, and Japan’s 
remarkably favorable tax treatment for such options when they are exercised  -- 
the 26% capital gains rate is far below the marginal income tax rate for ordinary 




Korea has moved rapidly to embrace global accounting standards, a stronger 
role for auditors, independent standards setting, and better disclosure. In 1998  
Korea’s newly-launched Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) overhauled   
Korean Financial Accounting Standards (KFAS) to bring them largely in line with 
the IAS, and external auditors were made mandatory for use by listed firms. New 
regulations also require detailed disclosure of financial transactions between 
chaebol blockholders and public firms. A newly independent institution for 
accounting standards, the Korean Accounting Standards Board (Hanguk hoegye 
kisun wiwon hoe or KASB), was created in June 1999, separating it from the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy.
80   
 
  
In Korea a broad series of measures were taken by the Kim Dae-jung 
government to create independent, outsider boards of directors, in contrast to the 
former pro forma boards that simply rubber-stamped the orders of the founder-
chairmen (or chong-suh). Chaebol must now obtain 50% of their directors from 
outside, with a strict set of conditions to ensure the independence of these 
directors from a controlling blockholder. The legal obstacles to filing a derivative 
                                                            
78According to Miyajima’s database of 100 leading public Japanese firms, the correlation between 
turnover and financial performance began to disappear in the period 1984-88. Miyajima’s more 
recent findings override earlier studies by Kaplan, which argued that Japanese executive 
turnover was little different from U.S. or European turnover.  Hideyaki Miyajima, “The Impact of 
Deregulation on Corporate Governance and Finance,” in L. Carlile and M. Tilton (eds.), Is Japan 
Really Changing its Ways? Regulatory Reform and the Japanese Economy (1998), page 68. 
Steven Kaplan, “Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of Germany, 
Japan, and the US.,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9 (1997), No. 4.   
79 Incentive compensation data in Japan, Germany and Korea is based on a 1999 internal survey 
by Towers & Perrin. There is considerable debate over the relationship between incentive 
compensation and firm performance, but recent research on the U.S. demonstrates a median 
elasticity of top manager compensation to firm performance (as measured by stock price) of 3.9.  
Brian Hall and Jefffrey Liebman, “Are CEO’s Really Paid like Bureaucrats?,” NBER paper #6213, 
10/97. The ratio of incentive compensation to total compensation for U.S. top managers is 52%, 
the highest in the Towers & Perrin sample and more than twice the mean. 
80Il-Sup Kim, “Financial Crisis and its Impact on the Accounting System in Korea,” Korea 
Accounting Standards Board, KASB manuscript (January 2000). 
 suit against a firm were reduced, from 1% to .01% of the stockholding, which 
made it much easier for small shareholders to bring such suits.  A flurry of such 
suits have been filed, of which several were won by the plaintiffs. Significantly, 
efforts to make class action suits easier to bring have been rejected by the 
National Assembly, allegedly due to counter-lobbying by the chaebol. 
 
Similarly, the change in institutions that shape contests for control in Korea has 
been dramatic – at least on paper. Korean regulations that limited hostile 
takeovers by capping such acquisitions at 10% of the target firm were removed. 
This was buttressed by abolishing the ban on acquisitions by foreigners and the 
requirement to obtain MOFE approval for merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions, and altering the tender requirements attached to minority share 
acquisitions to make it easier to acquire large blocks short of majority control. 
Korea has also witnessed changes in shareholder rules, such as regulations that 
increase the scope for minority shareholders to place items on the agenda of 
stockholder meetings and obtain access to company documents.    
  
Senior Korean managers still tend to be promoted and rotated within the chaebol 
group. Recent changes in Korean regulations make it easier to use stock options, 
but in actual practice their use remains low; as a result the ratio of performance-
based compensation to total compensation in Korea remains well below the 




Malaysian information institutions have rapidly moved to conformance with 
international standards across the board.  Malaysian GAAP (MGAAP) is virtually 
equivalent to IAS, with a few minor deviations.
  Reflecting the strong professional 
legacy of the Commonwealth, the accounting profession is well-organized 
through the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian 
Association of CPA’s (MACPA), and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) is relatively independent and professional in standards setting – an 
independence buttressed by a commitment, in principle, to IAS.  The Companies 
Act mandates third-party audit, a requirement backstopped by the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE).    
  
At least on paper, Malaysia’s oversight institutions also comport with international 
standards. Recent studies suggest that 90% of listed companies have at least 
two NED’s, and the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance has set a 
minimum of 30% independent NEDs on boards.  Malaysia’s legal system also 
imposes strong standards of fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, and the 
courts entertain derivative suits for breach of this duty, although class-action suits 
are not possible. The obligations of directors are also monitored by the 
Government Minority Shareholder Watchdog Committee, which was created at 
the recommendation of the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance. 
  
The Watchdog Committee, the Securities Commission, and the KLSE also 
enforce the one-share-one-vote rule, and ensure that minority shareholders have 
at least a voice in key corporate decisions. This has not lead to an active, 
competitive market for control, however, despite Malaysia’s Code of Takeovers 
and Mergers, which resembles the City Code in most respects. The state 
continues to exercise a veto right over most M&A decisions, including 
transactions involving the privatized state owned sector and all so-called 
bumiputra firms.  The state imposed a 30% cap on foreign ownership of 
bumiputra firms and banks, although this cap has been increased, removed, and 
re-imposed over time, which reduced the ability of foreign firms to engage in 
competitive contests for listed Malaysian firms.  
 
Malaysia’s market for managers is strongly affected by the state, which exercises 
considerable political influence over senior hiring decisions of state-affiliated and 
leading bumiputra firms, which are clustered in the property, transportation, and 
services sectors. Listed firms make extensive use of incentive compensation, 




Singapore’s information institutions conform to FPI governance standards in 
most respects. Singapore GAAP is functionally equivalent to IAS. In fact, the 
independent standards-setting committee, the Disclosure and Accounting 
Standards Committee (DASC) of the Institute of CPA’s of Singapore (ICPAS) has 
recommended that Singapore adopt IAS in its entirety. All companies in 
Singapore are required by law to be audited by approved auditors, who must 
hold a practicing certificate issued by the Public Accountants Board (the 
regulator), and such practicing accountants must also be members of ICPAS. 
The Big Five have a large market share in Singapore, and their professional 
standards are, according to anecdotal evidence, among the highest in Asia.   
  
Oversight institutions in Singapore are reasonably fair in protecting the interests 
of minority investors, and the listing rules of the Singapore Stock Exchange 
(SSE) include NED’s on all boards of public firms. The ratio of NED’s is estimated 
at 60%, although with the high proportion of private blockholders in listed 
companies, it is likely that many of these are nominees in practice. Like France, 
Singapore has a cadre of professional manager-bureaucrats that moves back 
and forth between the public and private sectors, and many of these individuals 
can be found on the boards of both private and privatized SOE firms on the SSE. 
Singapore law imposes a strong fiduciary duty on directors, and these are 
backed up by a court system that is generally fair and fast in the case of financial 
disputes.   
 
By the same token, Singapore company law provides for a one-share-one-vote 
rule, and the Voluntary Code on Takeovers is similar in most respects to the U.K. 
 City Code and is, by most accounts, reasonably effective in protecting minority 
rights during changes of control.  But public contests for control are extremely 
rare,  due to the remaining regulatory caps on foreign ownership (although these 
are in the process of being removed), the large presence of private blockholders 
(around 60%), the state’s exercise of informal guidance regarding M&A 
transactions, and finally due to the state’s preponderant position as an 
institutional investor through Temasek.   
 
The market for managers in Singapore is competitive by international standards; 
the quality is generally high, with quite a bit of turnover and extensive use of 
incentive compensation, among the highest in the twelve country sample at 31%.  




Despite its vigorous foreign trade, high levels of both inward and outwards FDI, 
and relatively untrammeled product-market competition, Taiwan has long had a 
highly regulated financial sector, and has systematically discouraged foreign 
portfolio investment.   Foreign investors were limited with both company-specific 
and overall market caps, through a cumbersome system of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) approvals and other bureaucratic red-tape.  Not 
surprisingly, there has been little official rush to make Taiwan’s corporate 
governance institutions more attractive to global investors.  
 
Taiwanese GAAP is similar to IAS and GAAP, but differs in several key areas, 
including asset valuation. There is poor disclosure of related party transactions.  
An independent standards-setting committee, the Accounting Research and 
Development Forum (ARDF), was established in 1984, and the 
recommendations of the ARDF are recognized by the MOF. The Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) requires third-party audit of listed firms, and 
corporate by-laws require a statutory internal auditor; as a result, the Big Five an 
estimated 80% market share in Taiwan through their local affiliates.  
 
Taiwan’s oversight institutions provide little protection for minority investors, and 
are dominated by private blockholders. 
81 The Taipei Stock Exchange and the 
SFC have listing requirements to include NED’s on boards, but according to 
anecdotal evidence these are overwhelmingly filled by family members or 
blockholder nominees.
82 The state has stepped in to modify oversight institutions, 
                                                            
81 C.Ko, K.Ding, C.Liu, Y. Yeh, “Corporate Governance in Chinese Taipei”, paper for OECD 
Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia, 3/5/99, page 10.  
82 “The closest thing to a requirement of independent directors is Rule 9(12) of the Listing Review 
Rules of the TSE. It requires all directors and supervisors to independently examine their 
functions and duties. Often, listing companies which are family-owned will agree to install 
independent directors after the IPO. This now accounts for 90% of the listing applications. 
However, such commitment to the TSE has only binding moral force. Often, such listed 
companies will re-elect back a majority of family members or affiliates in the next election. 
Therefore, the current status reflects a “cat and mouse game.”  Lawrence Liu, “Corporate 
 with the requirement that 20% of board seats of privatized SOE’s represent 
employees, an arrangement that resembles Germany’s Mitbestimmung rules.   
 
The Taiwan Company Law sets a threshold of 5% for derivative suits by minority 
shareholders, which effectively discourages such litigation, and other procedural 
rules make class action suits very difficult. 
83 A Minority Investment Protection Act 
is pending that would tighten the fiduciary responsibilities of directors by laying 
out the rules for stockholder suits.  In the meantime, the state itself has created a 
watchdog agency, the Securities and Futures Market Development Institute, that 
periodically sues blockholders for insider trading and other acts of expropriation, 




Taiwanese company law provides for one-share-one-vote principles, but there 
are very few market-based contests for control, for several reasons.  Private 
blockholders control 65% of the listed firms in Taiwan, making hostile offers 
unlikely to succeed. Moreover, the state has imposed tight limits on foreign 
holdings of any single Taiwanese firm, moving this cap only gradually from 15% 
to 30% to 50% over the years.  In 1997 the SFC moved to ban the practice of 
separating voting proxies from underlying shares, which had provided an opening 
for hostile bids. Finally, the SFC requires prior approval for tender offers, 
including hostile takeovers, and the state bureaucracy exercises informal 
guidance on large M&A decisions. 
 
Managers are hired and fired competitively, as would be expected in a private 
blockholder-controlled market. Taiwan’s booming high tech sector mimics in 
many ways the management practices of high tech firms elsewhere, including 
performance-based compensation and stock options; but these practices are still 
rare in the rest of the industrial sector.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Governance in Taiwan”, paper for International Conference on Corporate Governance of Chinese 
Listed Companies, 11/2/2000, Shanghai, page 5.  
83 Coordination costs are high, court and claim fees must be paid up front by the plaintiffs, and 
there is no civil discovery. Liu, op.cit., pages 10-11.  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Accounting Audit NED Duty Voting Takeover Incentive %
Belgium 3 30.0%
China 00 . 0 %
France 2 20.0%
Germany 1 10.0%
Italy 00 . 0 %
Japan 1 10.0%




Spain 00 . 0 %
Taiwan 1 10.0%
TOTAL 0 5 3 2 5 0 1 16
% CHANGE 0.0% 41.7% 25.0% 16.7% 41.7% 0.0% 8.3% 19.0%
GROUP TOTAL 5 5 5 1
% GROUP CHANGE 20.8% 20.8% 20.8% 8.3%
Corporate Governance Conformance





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TOTAL 3 8 4 2 5 0 6 28
% CHANGE 25.0% 66.7% 33.3% 16.7% 41.7% 0.0% 50.0% 33.3%
GROUP TOTAL 11 6 5 6
% GROUP CHANGE 45.8% 25.0% 20.8% 50.0%
Corporate Governance Conformance









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TOTAL 6 10 5 5 6 0 8 40
% CHANGE 50.0% 83.3% 41.7% 41.7% 50.0% 0.0% 66.7% 47.6%
GROUP TOTAL 16 10 6 8
% GROUP CHANGE 66.7% 41.7% 25.0% 66.7%
Corporate Governance Conformance
INFORMATION OVERSIGHT CONTROL TOTAL
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 